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The sustainability of fiscal policy is still one of the most debated issues in current 
macroeconomics. A disciplined and sound fiscal policy has a significant positive impact on 
economic growth, inflation, and macroeconomic stability. However, since the 1970s, fiscal 
deficits and rising public debt have been a common features of government budgetary positions. 
Many attempts have been done to control governments’ propension towards excessive deficit 
and debt realizations.  
Chapter I describes how, depending on the historical period, fiscal policymakers have tried to 
restore fiscal discipline in different ways: starting from the 1970s, many countries embarked in 
several fiscal consolidation programs, differently from the 1990s onwards, that were 
characterized by the widespread adoption of fiscal rules and the creation independent fiscal 
councils. 
This shift from an unconstrained to a rule-based fiscal policy has been inspired by the revolution 
in monetary policy institutions and that took place in the 1980s and 1990s, characterized by 
establishment of independent and accountable central banks committed to policy rules.  
The adoption of rules-based monetary policy finds its theoretical support in the works of 
Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983), which shows that the commitment 
to a specific inflation target eliminates the inflation bias, differently from the case without 
commitment in which the unconstrained policymaker is tempted to increase the level of 
inflation in an attempt to reduce unemployment below the natural level, though it results 
without success. 
Chapter II focuses mainly on the advantages deriving from commitment, rather than discretion, 
both in monetary and in fiscal policy. In particular it is argued that, similarly to the case of 
monetary policy, in which the inflation bias is resolved through the commitment to a specific 
policy rule, even in fiscal policy the commitment solution may results in a reduction of the 
excessive deficit and debt bias. 
Chapter III contains an empirical analysis performed on a sample of 22 Euro Area countries 
from 2005 to 2018 which suggests that fiscal rules and fiscal councils, interpreted as 
commitment devices, shape fiscal behaviours towards a higher fiscal discipline. More 
specifically, it is found that the presence of fiscal rules and independent fiscal councils is 
associated to higher general government primary balances. 
In addition, it is found that fiscal rules and independent fiscal councils are also associated to 




fiscal forecasts favours a more effective and conscious policy choice, which is again more likely 
to results in a lower deficit. 
 
1 Fiscal policy trends: an overview 
1.1 Fiscal Discipline: renew interest  
The sustainability of fiscal policy is still one of the most debated issues in current 
macroeconomics. Fiscal policy has a significant impact on economic growth, inflation and 
macroeconomic stability.  
Especially in favour of the macroeconomic stability, a disciplined and sound fiscal policy 
represents a pivotal element. Following the high debt levels experienced by several developed 
economies since the mid-1970s, see Azzimonti et al. (2014), in the aftermath of the 2007 global 
crisis, and certainly nowadays, after the unprecedented economic crisis linked with the spread 
of the Covid-19 Pandemic, an intense concern over the fiscal sustainability is predominant both 
in the academic literature and in the public policy debate.  
Figure 1 shows the huge increase of government debt forecasted for the following years, due to 
the enormous increase in public expenditure put in place to contrast the catastrophic economic 
effects caused by the spread of the Coronavirus pandemic. Figure 1 also transmits the high level 
of economic uncertainty that characterizes the period we ae living: it is sufficient to look at the 
impressive differences between forecasts made in Autumn 2019 (before the pandemic), 
compared with the forecasts made after the pandemic outbreak (April and June 2020). Even 
more significant is the difference in forecasts between April and June 2020, even though the 




Figure 1: G20 Government Debt and Fiscal Balance Forecasts 
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1.2 The Deficit Bias 
But the build-up of public debt in most industrial countries is not a new story. It can be rooted 
back in the mid-1970s . The period since the 1970s has seen a rise in the share of government 
in economic activity in the advanced economies and the consequent widening of fiscal 
imbalances. In fact, the strong rise in government outlays was not matched by a commensurate 
improvement in revenue performance. 
Tanzi and Schuknecht (1997) assert that government debt rose considerably over the past 
decades and this trend was generally accompanied by an expansion in the size of general 
government expenditures: as shown by the authors, the average size of public expenditure-to-
GDP ratio o for a group of thirteen industrial countries increased in the 20th century from 12% 
of GDP in 1913 to 43% of GDP in 1990. At the end of the period, average public debt-to-GDP 
ratio was 79% for the big governments, 60% for medium-sized governments and 53% for small 
governments1.  
 Due to the difficulty of countries in containing government indebtedness, a large literature on 
the bias toward large deficits and excessive debt has developed.  
The deficit bias is namely the tendency of governments to allow deficit and public debt levels 
to increase. 
 
1 Where big governments are defined as those with higher than 50%; medium-sized governments: 




A central focus on the deficit bias has been the research on the main macroeconomic 
consequences provoked by excessive deficits and high and persistent public debts. 
As Merola (2012) states, accumulating debt is not only and always a bad thing: on the one hand, 
in fact, it can help smooth real activity, but on the other hand it can create vulnerabilities and 
affect macroeconomic performance. 
The good reasons governments to borrow are that public debt allows governments to smooth 
taxes in the face of cyclical revenue changes, and it increases the flexibility of the private sector 
in responding to variations in income and spending opportunities. Furthermore, it can help 
smooth consumption not only over the lifetime of individuals, but also across generations. 
Therefore, debt improves the efficiency of resources allocation and allows risks to be shifted to 
those most able to bear them. 
However, the accumulation of debt certainly involves risks if done without prudence, hence a 
prerogative of public debt for not turning into a threat is to maintain it sustainable in the long 
run. Sutherland et al. (2012) argued that targeting a prudent debt level would provide a long-
run anchor for fiscal policy. The literature, however, does not reach firm conclusions as to the 
desirable debt level, on the contrary it confirms that determining empirically the optimal level 
of debt is not straightforward.  
The first drawback of high public debt levels is that they may have adverse effects on growth 
and inflation (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010, Kumar and Woo, 2010 and Checherita and Rother, 
2010). While it is known that the economic growth rate has a linear negative impact on the 
public debt-to-GDP ratio, also high levels of public debt are likely to be deleterious for growth, 
but potentially only after a certain threshold has been reached. 
In the domain of fiscal policy, Égert (2010) individuates that high public debt levels can induce 
fiscal policy to become pro-cyclical and less effective. Procyclical fiscal policies, that is policies 
that are expansionary in booms and contractionary in recessions, are generally regarded as 
potentially damaging for welfare: they raise macroeconomic volatility, depress investment in 
real and human capital, hamper growth, and harm the poor (IMF, 1996). If expansionary fiscal 
policies in bad times are not fully offset in good times, they may further strengthen the bias 
towards deficit and lead to debt unsustainability. 
As regards financial markets, high current and expected future debt can lead to debt financing 
problems, which can push up interest rates on government bonds.  
An example for what just said is provided by Haugh et al. (2009), namely that interest rate 
spreads in the Euro Area are influenced by the level of the debt service ratio, with the 




The concept of excessive deficit and debt is inevitably linked with the concept of fiscal 
discipline: in fact, both theoretical and empirical literature suggests that a fundamental factor 
that determined the strong persistence of deficits, as well as the tremendous rise in public sector 
indebtedness, over the past decades in so many countries have been the inadequate fiscal 
discipline and weak fiscal management.  
According to Kumar et al. (2007) fiscal discipline is in place when governments maintain fiscal 
positions that are consistent with macroeconomic stability and sustained economic growth. 
More specifically, a sustainable and disciplined fiscal policy is qualified by the avoidance of 
borrowing that exceeds the servicing capacity in order to prevent excessive debt accumulation. 
At the same time, policy needs to be judicious in pursuing resource allocation and distributional 
objectives, and in smoothing output fluctuations. Moreover, the authors define as a prudent 
fiscal behaviour the creation of budgetary cushions that permits to effectively respond to both 
adverse shocks and to deal with predictable fiscal pressures, such as those arising from 
population aging, without overly compromising the debt level. 
 
To understand the current interest in fiscal policy sustainability, it is useful to recapitulate the 
broad fiscal trends that interested fiscal policy starting from the 1970s until nowadays. 
More specifically, three distinguishable trends have been identified: the first one concerns the 
period of fiscal consolidations that began in the 1970s and continued until the 1990s; the second 
regards the generalized adoption of fiscal rules that mainly characterized the period from 1990 
onwards. The third trend is the progressive creation of independent fiscal councils that followed 
the global financial crises of 2007-09 . At the end of the chapter, a brief space is dedicated to 
the current situation, in which fiscal rules have been temporarily suspended because of the 
Coronavirus pandemic and the related economic crisis. 
1.3 Fiscal consolidations  
The period since the 1970s has seen a rise in the share of government in economic activity in 
the advanced economies and the consequent widening of fiscal imbalances. In fact, the strong 
rise in government outlays was not matched by a commensurate improvement in revenue 
performance. 
Due to the deterioration of public finances, from the mid-1970s onward, a number of countries 
implemented medium-term fiscal adjustment plans; these met with success in only some cases, 
however. In fact, between 1970 and 1995, out of the 74 episodes identified in IMF (1996), there 
were only 14 documented cases of successful fiscal adjustment in industrial countries. This 




explored the wide range of factors that that may determine the success or the unsuccess of fiscal 
policy.  
1.4 The role of credibility in fiscal consolidations. 
Several authors have put particular attention on the effects that a fiscal policy may produce on 
growth. Theoretically, the net effect of tight fiscal policy on growth is uncertain, even though 
for decades economists have put attention mainly to its negative Keynesian effects. According 
to the Keynesian view, fiscal consolidation undermines economic growth because it leads to a 
contraction of the aggregate demand. The fall in demand, as explained in Heylen and Everaert 
(2000), occurs either directly, when the government reduces its consumption or investment, or 
indirectly when households reduce their consumption due to higher taxes or lower transfers, 
which reduce their disposable income. Moreover, the fall in aggregate demand may be 
reinforced when private investment responds negatively to the (expected) fall in output caused 
by lower private consumption or government spending.  
In the 1990s, however, this view has been heavily criticized. Several authors have advanced 
that fiscal consolidation may also generate expansionary demand effects. In particular, the 
attention has been put on the positive effects that a credible fiscal consolidation may generate 
on the economic agent’s expectation. However, whether these positive effects are strong enough 
to compensate the negative Keynesian effects still remains uncertain. In this respect the 
literature points at the crucial role of the specific characteristics of the consolidation programme 
and at the circumstances in which consolidation takes place. 
A strand of the literature on fiscal consolidations is indeed concentrated on the wide range of 
factors that may determine the success or the unsuccess of the fiscal consolidation process.  
The definition of “successful” when dealing with fiscal consolidation varies depending on the 
authors. For example, Alesina and Perotti (1995, 1997) define as successful those fiscal 
adjustments which in three years produce a reduction of the debt-to-GDP ratio of at least 5%, 
while the IMF (1996), based on McDermott and Wescott (1996), calls “successful” those 
stabilizations that manage to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio by at least 3% within two years and 
it terms “aggressive fiscal impulse” a tightening of the budget of at least 1.5 percentage points 
of GDP for at least 2 years. 
Important factors to take into account when dealing with a fiscal consolidation are, for example, 
the composition of the fiscal measures (whether they are based on tax increases, rather than 
expenditure cuts), their size and speed of implementation, the economic context under which it 




For instance, Alesina and Perotti (1995), and Von Hagen et al. (2002) focused on the 
importance of the composition of the fiscal adjustment. The authors found that consolidations 
based on expenditure cuts tend to be more effective than those that include a tax increase. Their 
view is that fiscal adjustment programmes that rely mainly on cutting government consumption 
-especially the wage bill and transfers- have a high probability of success, i.e. a high probability 
of generating strong economic growth and reducing the debt ratio. Programmes that rely mainly 
on tax rises and government investment cuts, on the other hand, are expected to fail. Alesina 
and Perotti argue that government wage bill and transfer cuts, in contrast to tax rises and 
investment cuts, benefit from favourable credibility and expectation effects on demand. Alesina 
and Perotti (1996) argue that governments which intervene in politically more delicate 
components of the budget (e.g. public employment or social security) signal that they are really 
serious about the fiscal adjustment. This makes raise their credibility and, consequently, reduces 
the risk premium (default risk, inflation risk) on government debt. As a result, also the real 
interest rate falls, and this reflects in a crowding-in in private investment. In addition to this, 
Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) sustain that the fall in interest rates may also cause a rise of asset 
prices and consequently of market value of private wealth, which would further boost private 
consumption. Besides the composition, also its size and duration have been found to be 
determinant for the success of the fiscal consolidation. Authors, like Giavazzi and Pagano 
(1995) and McDermott and Wescott (1996) focused on the idea that large and persistent fiscal 
adjustments have a better chance of success, whatever their composition. They sustain that 
differently from small and temporary adjustments, drastic and long-lasting ones are more 
effective because they manage to affect expectations by signalling that policy makers are 
seriously engaged in fighting debt and deficits. Second, drastic adjustments provide a stronger 
signal of a change in the policy regime and, thus, of future tax reductions. Hence, they will be 
accompanied by a more vigorous private consumption and investment growth, and thus by 
stronger output growth. Related to this aspect, Blanchard (1990) adds that drastic and persistent 
fiscal adjustments provide clarity, by reducing uncertainty about future fiscal policy, and may 
therefore reduce also precautionary savings. This should further support demand and output.  
By the way, this hypothesis has not come out unscathed from critics: Alesina and Perotti (1996) 
have put forward just the opposite argument. They state that large spending cuts or tax increases 
may undermine the political survival of the governments which has committed to fiscal 
consolidation and, as a consequence, the credibility and expectation effects of large cuts may 
be reduced. Empirically, the available evidence seems to support the previous hypothesis: 




rise strongly during periods of large and persistent government spending cuts and tax increases. 
In the opposite case, when spending cuts and tax increases were neither large, nor persistent, 
the standard Keynesian effect of falling private consumption tended to be observed. In support 
to this, McDermott and Wescott (1996) found that it is more likely to reduce the debt ratio when 
the magnitude of the fiscal consolidation is large. As regards the appropriate moment to 
undertake a fiscal consolidation, Blanchard (1990) and Sutherland (1995) have proposed 
models which show that the fiscal consolidation is more effective when the economy is in a 
situation of emergency, i.e. when the debt ratio is very high or has risen strongly in little time. 
In this case, the explanation is that in economies in which consumers and investors are aware 
that the “day of reckoning” comes closer and that a fiscal crisis is likely to arise, a fiscal 
consolidation may generate some favourable expectation effects on private consumption and 
investment. According to the authors, at low and sustainable debt levels, current consumers 
face the burden of the fiscal adjustment (e.g. tax increases) without enjoying properly the 
benefits associated with the adjustment. Hence, in such situation, the negative Keynesian effects 
of fiscal policy contraction may then dominate. On the contrary, when the economy is close to 
the crisis, current consumers will understand that a fiscal adjustment “now” will reduce the 
probability of disruptive tax increases in the near future. So, the fiscal adjustment will strongly 
raise their permanent income and stimulate their consumption. As regards the role played by 
the economic situation (both domestic and international), Alesina and Perotti (1995) and 
McDermott and Wescott (1996) sustain that fiscal consolidation has a much higher probability 
of success if the international macroeconomic situation is supportive, i.e. characterized by high 
real output growth and low real interest rates, since with these conditions it is easier to reduce 
the public debt. On the other hand, to reduce debt ratios during a global recession is, of course, 
much harder, especially if at the same time interest rates are high. In support to this hypothesis, 
both Alesina and Perotti (1995) and McDermott and Wescott (1996) have empirically found 
that while in the early 1980s in the OECD the economic growth was low and real interest rates 
high, most of all attempts of fiscal consolidation typically failed. Instead, in the second half of 
the 1980s, which was a period marked by a high OECD economic growth , successful fiscal 
consolidations took place. Several authors (e.g. Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990; Alesina and Perotti, 
1996; Perotti, 1996) have noted that the most of the just mentioned successful consolidation 
episodes of the ‘80s were preceded by, or coincided with, a sizeable devaluation followed by a 
pegging of the exchange rate. This was the case of Denmark (1983-86) and Ireland (1986-89) 
among others. From this observation one might derive the hypothesis that a devaluation 




and Hjelm (2002) suggest that the effect of exchange rate (including both nominal and real) on 
the success of fiscal consolidations -albeit significant- is relatively small. In addition, Ahrend 
et al. (2006) have found that while the real exchange rate depreciation may favour the start and 
continuation of a fiscal consolidation, it may fail to favour the debt reduction significantly. 
In fact, not only successful, but also many unsuccessful consolidation episodes were preceded 
by a devaluation: some examples are Italy (1982-83) and France (1983-87).  
 
1.5 Fiscal Rules 
After debt and expenditure ratios to GDP had been on an upward trend since the early 1970s, 
and economists had analysed these events in terms of deficit and spending biases, it became 
increasingly common for fiscal policy makers during the 1990s to voluntarily surrender some 
of their policy discretion by subjecting themselves to fiscal rules. 
A widely used definition of fiscal rule is the one proposed by Kopits and Symanski (1998, p. 
2), according to which a fiscal rule is : 
 
“a permanent constraint on fiscal policy, expressed in terms of a summary indicator of fiscal 
performance, such as the government budget deficit, borrowing, debt or a major component 
thereof”.  
 
 Fiscal rules are long-lasting constraints on fiscal policy whose role is to strengthen the 
credibility of fiscal policy over time and to provide commitment to fiscal discipline. These rules 
set numerical limits on a budgetary aggregate (e.g. level of public debt, deficit, growth of public 
expenditures). These constraints are useful to address deficit biases (that can lead to excessive 
debt levels) and procyclical policies (exacerbating economic cycles), ultimately helping 
promote more prudent and stabilizing fiscal policies.
2 
At the same time, fiscal rules must be 
sufficiently flexible to manage unexpected economic or other large shocks (Eyraud et al., 2018). 
This is particularly relevant for rare events that can have very large fiscal and economic impacts, 
such as the current pandemic, and will likely require escape clauses to allow temporary 
deviations from the rules. 
The main reasons that explained the adoption of fiscal rules comprise again the will of 
strengthening fiscal solvency and sustainability (i.e. attaining sustainable levels of government 
deficits and public debt), contributing to macroeconomic (or cyclical) stabilization (i.e. 
reducing fiscal policy pro-cyclicality or raising policy counter-cyclicality), see Schmidt-Hebbel 




As figure 2 shows, the worldwide spread adoption of fiscal rules started in the 1990s, as part of 
significant reforms of fiscal frameworks in many industrial and emerging/developing countries.  
 
 
Figure 2 - Adoption of fiscal rules for period 1985-2015 
 
This shift in fiscal frameworks was certainly inspired by the revolution in monetary policy 
institutions and that took place in the 1980s and 1990s. the need of Reforms of central banks 
and their monetary policy came after the 1970s Great Inflation, and the positive policy 
experience of the independent Fed and Bundesbank lead many to establish independent and 
accountable central banks since the 1980s. The mandate of the newly independent central banks 
consisted in the conduct of the monetary policy under conditions of transparency and 
accountability, in order to raise policy effectiveness, increase economic efficiency, and 
strengthen democratic accountability. The failures of unconstrained fiscal policies and the lack 
of appropriate fiscal institutions, summed with the successful rule-based monetary policies 
conducted by independent central banks – have led since the 1990s to wide adoption of fiscal 
restrictions and fiscal rules, reforms of fiscal policy frameworks, in industrial and emerging 
countries. 
The extensive literature on fiscal rules allows to identify four general objectives of fiscal rules 
and restrictions, in order to overcome the failures that characterize the behaviour of 
unconstrained fiscal policy. The first is to strengthen fiscal solvency and sustainability by 




The second is to contribute to the macroeconomic (or cyclical) stabilization by reducing the 
damaging fiscal policy pro-cyclicality and enforcing policy counter-cyclicality. The third is to 
strengthen fiscal policy design and execution and make them more resilient to government 
failures by strengthening the political economy of fiscal policy decisions and budgetary 
procedures. The fourth and final is to improve intergenerational equity. 
However, imposing fiscal rules and restrictions also implies costs, especially in the rules 
implemented is badly or too narrowly defined. As a matter of fact, if a fiscal rule is to strict and 
rigid, without a clear and predetermined escape clause2, may results in a “straitjacketed” fiscal 
policy when severe macroeconomic or budget shocks of an unexpected type or magnitude 
materialize, as expressed by Hughes-Hallett and Lewis (2005). 
Hence the compliance with the rules during unforeseen events could have large macroeconomic 
costs, by limiting the policymaker’s flexibility and forcing this one to either to incur in the rule 
or to suspend the enforcement of the rule. As example, during and after the 2008–9 global 
financial crisis, the EU’s unconditional Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) ceilings on fiscal 
deficit and debt levels were almost systematically violated, leading to the adoption of a new set 
of fiscal rules and procedures (the “six-pack,” “two-pack,” and fiscal compact). Therefore, 
countries that face very high levels of macroeconomic and budget volatility can refrain from 
adopting fiscal rules and restrictions in order to preserve more flexibility to face an unforeseen 
shock. 
Nowadays, European governments recurred to the activation of the escape clauses in order to 
respond promptly and with the highest degree of flexibility to the economic consequences of 
the Coronavirus crisis. 
1.6 Types of fiscal rules:  
Policy experience and the literature, see as examples Kopits and Symansky (1998) and Morris 
et al. (2006), suggest that fiscal rules should be clearly defined, oriented to their policy 
objectives, transparent, simple, flexible enough in to avoid policy paralysis, consistent with 
budgetary and macroeconomic reality, enforceable, and efficient.  
In general, fiscal rules should be applied to different government levels and in different shapes 
and forms. National governments establish national rules on their budgets, in contrast to sub-
national rules established at state or provincial level. Supranational rules, instead, are 
established at the level of a union of sovereign states, such as the EU. 
 




Fiscal rules, as said before, consist in quantitative constraints on fiscal policy that are based on 
numerical targets, which are established for a given fiscal indicator or budget aggregate.  
Numerical targets may be set unconditionally, as they are in the EU’s Maastricht Treaty 
unconditional debt at 60% of GDP and deficit ceilings at 3% of GDP, or may be conditional on 
certain macroeconomic aggregates, like for example government spending targeted to estimates 
of potential GDP levels and of long-term commodity prices or commodity fund assets (as it 
happens in Chile and Norway). 
Different types of fiscal rules can be distinguished according to the budgetary aggregate to 
which they refer. Schaechter et al.(2012) identifies four main categories of rules: (i) Debt rules 
that set an explicit limit or target on public debt in percent of GDP, (ii) Budget balance rules 
that set an explicit limit or target on the budget balance in percent of GDP. The targets can be 
set on the overall budget balance, the primary budget balance (excluding net interest payments), 
or the recurrent budget balance (this is the golden rule, which targets the overall balance net of 
capital expenditure). The budget balance measure can be specified as actual balance, cyclically 
adjusted or structural balance, or “over the business cycle balance.” (iii) Expenditure rules that 
set limits on total, primary, or current spending. They are set in absolute or growth terms, or in 
percent of GDP. (iv) Revenue rules that set ceilings or floors on government revenue. They are 
set in absolute or growth terms, or in percent of GDP. 
Schaechter et al. (2012) also concentrate on the different advantages and drawbacks that each 
type of rules implies. For example, debt and balance rules are renown for providing a close link 
to the policy objective of debt sustainability, but do not favour cyclical stabilization policies. 
This could contribute to fiscal policy pro-cyclicality. On the contrary, expenditure and revenue 
rules enhance cyclical stabilization, but they are not directly linked to debt sustainability. That 
is why many countries combine more than one type fiscal rule, so that their overall effect on 
fiscal policy might be positive. 
In contrast with numeral rules, the fiscal rules’ framework may also be characterized by the so-
called “procedural rules”, which clearly regulate the attributes and interactions of subjects that 
take part in the budget process. Their main aim is to enhance transparency, accountability, and 





1.7 Independent Fiscal Councils (IFCs) 
 
The deep fiscal surge of government deficits and debts left by the Global Financial Crisis of 
2007–09 shook confidence in public debt sustainability. Faced with mixed records about the 
effectiveness of numerical fiscal rules, many governments decided to create national 
nonpartisan fiscal institutions, typically referred to as fiscal councils or parliamentary budget 
offices, to further strengthen the institutional framework, shaping fiscal policy and boost the 
credibility of their commitment to meet their obligations in full and to act virtuously after the 
crisis. 
 
Figure 3 – Number of fiscal councils 
 
 
IFCs were initially viewed as a parallel to the delegation of monetary policy to independent 
central banks with the remit of eliminating inflation bias. The delegation of fiscal policy to an 
independent fiscal authority should have worked similarly as a method of counteracting deficit 
bias.  
However, the idea of delegating actual fiscal decisions to independent experts was never put 
into practice. That happened because, as fiscal decisions, differently from monetary-policy 
decisions, are certainly much more redistributive, and hence more political. So, a stand must be 





Therefore the academic discussion, see for example OECD (2014), focused instead to 
independent fiscal councils without decision-making power but with a role of “fiscal 
watchdog”, whose main remit is to keep under observation potential fiscal risks and alert, if 
necessary, politicians and voters. Therefore, as stated by Calmfors (2015), independent fiscal 
council’s aim is to influence policy either directly, through inputs into the decision-making 
process, or indirectly through analysis and participation in the public discussion. 
 
A fiscal watchdog can counteract several of the mechanisms that may strengthen the bias of 
fiscal policy towards deficit. More specifically, IFCs are expected to: 
(i) Provide better information, both to politicians and voters. This could decrease “fiscal 
illusion” and increase general awareness of the government’s intertemporal budget constraint.  
(ii) Reduce informational asymmetries between the government and the electorate by providing 
accurate information on actual deficits and by making them more conscious as regards deficit’ 
long-run consequences.  
(iii) produce the macroeconomic and fiscal forecasts or assess the government’s own forecast. 
In this way they have the ability to impede government to deliberately use over-optimistic 
growth forecasts to justify deficits for example. 
(v) Raise the reputation cost for a government of deficits by providing more accurate estimates 
of them and outlining the future consequences.  
(vi) in addition, a fiscal council could help identify and warn against unsustainable booms that 
when bursting can trigger fiscal crises.  
 
Many early academic proposals, such as Wyplosz (2005), saw independent fiscal institutions 
as a substitute for rules, allowing discretionary policymaking with more flexibility than rules. 
However, in practice fiscal councils usually coexist with rules, so it seems more appropriate to 
consider them as complements. 
In fact, Beetsma and Debrun (2016), suggest that many independent fiscal councils’ 
characteristics are strongly complementary to fiscal rules. For example, deficit bias may be 
weakened by fiscal rules and fiscal councils separately, and this effect may be greater when 
both are present. 
Fiscal rule provides a clear benchmark for fiscal councils in the judgement of a certain policy. 
In addition, the existence of fiscal councils could also influence how rules are formulated. There 
is a fundamental trade-off between simple rules (such as a ceiling on the actual deficit), which 




more complex rules result more adequate because of their flexibility but also more difficult to 
verify. Monitoring by independent and competent experts could permit the rules to be more 
complex but at the same time more effective. 
 
1.8 Fiscal Rules during the Coronavirus pandemic 
With the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic and the related economic crisis, many countries 
decided to suspend their fiscal rules. 
In particular, to face the economic downturn deriving from the crisis, governments recurred to 
a huge increase in public budget deficit. For example, as reported in the IMF’s Special Series 
on Fiscal Policies to Respond to Covid-19 (IMF 2020a), the European Union has activated its 
general escape clause, which allows members states to temporarily stop any measures they had 
to implement to meet their targets. 
The European decision to suspend any fiscal commitment proved the importance of having 
well-designed escape clauses, that not only they allow for a prompt response to shocks, but also 
they establish strong governments fiscal credibility in times of crisis.  
In fact, escape clauses define a clear plan on how to proceed in the case of an unexpected severe 
crisis, allow to commit in advance to exceeding certain fiscal limits in very specific and 
unprecedented cases, but also provide the government with an opportunity to lay out a 
credible plan to return to compliance after the shock. 
The coronavirus outbreak revealed the weakness of current fiscal rules to flexibly adjust to 
unexpected shocks. The proposals for a revision of the fiscal framework are increasing: an 
authorative one was recently advanced by Blanchard et al. (2020), who find existing fiscal rules 
lacking and propose rather a shift to new fiscal standards that also consider changes in economic 
conditions. In particular it is criticised that current fiscal rules are written only as a function of 
debt, deficit levels and national output gaps, while it should be necessary that they count also 
EU-level output gaps, constraints on monetary policy, growth expectations, current and 
expected interest costs, and institutional and political capacity for future fiscal adjustment. In 
this way, fiscal standards should better accommodate the specific needs of individual countries 
and improve the effectiveness of their fiscal policy. 
However, caution is always needed when changing fiscal rules as there are costs. For example, 
frequent revisions may signal weak government commitment to fiscal discipline and have 
adverse market reactions and should ensure the new rules are consistent with forward-looking 




This said, it is certainly important that fiscal rules include contingencies to accommodate large 
and effective fiscal responses to severe and unprecedented crises, but it is equally important 
that fiscal rules will provide clear guidance for building up savings in times of exceptional 
positive shocks. The COVID-19 outbreak has led to wider deficits and higher sovereign debt, 
and when times will be better, it is imperative that fiscal rules ensure that governments save 







2 Commitment versus discretion in monetary and fiscal policy 
This chapter divides into three sections: the first section introduces the time-inconsistency 
problem of optimal policies and the related debate in the choice between commitment and 
discretion. The second and the third section address the time-inconsistency problem in the 
context of monetary and fiscal policy respectively. 
 
2.1 Commitment vs Discretion: Theoretical Background  
 
The time inconsistency of optimal policy finds its basis on the seminal paper of Kydland and 
Prescott (1977). Their work evolves from the critique advanced by Robert Lucas in the mid-
1970s, which sustains that when performing policy evaluations it is necessary to consider the 
interactions between government policies and private agents' expectations and emphasises that 
rational agents' decisions are also based on their expectations about future policies. To make an 
example, the agents choose how much to consume and save on the basis of their expectations 
about future taxes and monetary instruments. This aspect has raised the interest in developing 
economic models capable of taking into account these types of strategic interactions between 
private agents and the policymaker. Major contribution in the investigation of this topic has 
been given by papers of Kydland and Prescott (1977), and Barro and Gordon (1983), which 
analysed government decision problems where agents' decisions are based on rational 
expectations about future e policies and clarified the importance of policymakers' credibility. 
Kydland and Prescott (1977) formulated a stringent requirement of rationality in the mid-late 
1970s, for which rational and forward-looking agents have the capability to recognize the 
difference between a credible and a non-credible policy rule. The authors consider a 
policymaker who makes policy plans in order to maximize the welfare of its citizens and they 
show that the resulting policy decisions suffer of time-inconsistency. It means that, that in a 
world of forward-looking rational agents, an optimal policy announced at time t = 0 ceases to 
be optimal at every future point in time, t > 0. This creates the incentive of the policymaker to 
re-optimize and renege on earlier policy promises, since he is moved by the objective of 
achieving a higher social welfare. 
People will form their expectations of future policy on the basis of the known incentive of the 




credible, unless the government is forced in advance to keep its promises, by making binding 
commitments that prevent him to change his policies at a future date. When policy plans are 
not credible, rational agents realize that future policies will not necessarily coincide with the 
announced plans and they will adjust their expectations on the basis of the policy-maker’s 
incentives to deviate . An economic equilibrium, under this more demanding definition of 
rationality, consists of optimal and mutually consistent private decisions, as well as a policy 
rule which is the equilibrium outcome of a policy selection game. 
Commitment is the ability to keep on past promises, no matter what the particular current 
situation is. The lack of commitment, discretion, implies that a policymaker is allowed to 
change policy depending on current circumstances and to disregard any past promises. Because 
the discretionary planner does not make any binding commitments, one may think that that 
discretion offers more flexibility and that it is way more preferable with respect to a framework 
in which the policymaker is obliged to “tie hands” in front of past promises. But the authors, 
through the use of several examples, have demonstrated that the social welfare that a 
policymaker can obtain when it is committed on past promises is generally higher than the 
welfare under discretion. 
In other words, the optimal policy under commitment is time-consistent, while under discretion 
it is time-inconsistent, because the government has incentive to deviate from previously 
announced policy. Further, the time inconsistent policy under discretion usually implies welfare 
losses relative to the optimal policy under commitment. 
 An optimal but time inconsistent policy rule will not be believed by rational private agents, 
reason for which time inconsistency implies lack of credibility.  
One of the scopes of this line of research is to emphasizes the benefits of commitment relative 
to discretion, namely the benefit of having institutions that make it difficult to renege on policy 
promises. Irreversible commitments are valuable because they lend credibility to policy and 
enable the policymaker to influence private sector expectations.  
If the policy rule is selected by the government once and for all, without subsequent re-planning, 
then rational private agents will adapt their expectation, by taking this policy rule into account, 
and this is the end of the story. But if instead policy choice is sequential, and it is made period 
after period, then the policymaker is subject to an incentive constraint. Private expectations will 
not adjust to any pre-announced policy rule. Rational expectations will instead reflect the 
equilibrium policy choice of future periods. Therefore, current policy decisions will be able to 




outcomes. This incentive constraint limits what the government can achieve and results in 
reduced welfare, compared to the situation in which binding policy commitments are feasible. 
2.2 Commitment vs Discretion: Monetary Policy 
Time inconsistency is a generic issue for policymakers in all areas, even though the literature 
has mostly related this problem to the monetary policy framework. Following the fundamental 
paper by Kyland and Prescott, Barro and Gordon (1983), gave a fundamental contribution in 
the debate between commitment and discretion in the problem of time inconsistency that may 
affects monetary policy decisions. Thanks to these two authors, the credibility of monetary 
policy became an important topic of interest. In particular, the main issue was to find if there 
may be macroeconomic gains from enhancing credibility either by formal commitment to a 
policy rule or by introducing some kind of institutional arrangements that achieve the same 
scope. 
Barro and Gordon describe a discretionary monetary regime in which the policymaker in a first 
moment put in place a series of monetary rules that influence people’ s expectations on the 
inflation level that will prevail on the future period (the expected inflation). But once these 
expectations are formed, the monetary authority has the temptation to deviate from the rule 
previously announced, by printing more money and create more inflation than people expect. 
This happens because surprise inflation brings benefits like the expansion in the economic 
activity and the reduction of the unemployment rate below its natural level, as well as a decrease 
in the real value of the government's nominal liabilities. 
However, since people foresee that the policymaker has incentives to “cheat” in order to create 
benefits from inflation shocks, they will modulate their expectations such that inflation’s 
surprises -and the associated benefits- are systematically ruled out in equilibrium. In this case, 
the potential possibility of creating inflation shocks makes people’ s inflation expectations 
going upwards, which ex-post it translates in an equilibrium in which the average rates of 
inflation and monetary growth -and the corresponding costs of inflation- will be higher than 
otherwise. 
More specifically, Barro and Gordon suppose that the monetary authority has two objectives, 
namely the level of inflation (π) and unemployment (u), and that its preferences are expressed 
by a loss utility function L(π,u). The authority final scope is to minimize this function, under 
the constraint represented by the Phillips curve. Figure 4 better depicts the problem of time 
inconsistency examined by the authors. Suppose that the initial situation is represented by point 
A, in which unemployment is at its natural level and current and expected inflation are both 




this situation is not optimal for the authority, that would minimize its loss function in point B, 
which can be obtained by increasing the rate of monetary supply, conditioned to the fact that 
private agents’ expectations remain unchanged. If this happens, it means that the authority has 
managed to “cheat” individuals, the unemployment will be below the natural rate and inflation 
will be a little higher. The problem arises because rational and forward-looking individuals will 
fully understand that the authority has the incentive to deviate from the promised plan and 
behaving in an opportunistic way, so that they will respond accordingly by modifying their 
expectations in the hypothesis that the supply of money will grow exactly as planned by the 
authority when passing from point A to point B. 
That is why point B will never be reached by the system, but rather point C will be the new 
equilibrium, characterized by unemployment at its natural level, but at the expense of an even 
higher rate of inflation (current and expected). In point C, the loss function of the authority is 
certainly higher with respect to the initial point A, since unemployment is the same but there is 
greater inflation. 
Hence, the best monetary policy, however, is the one that leads to point B, but the problem is 
that it is also a time-inconsistent policy, and due to the presence of rational individuals, such 
policy ends to generate a worse position with respect to the initial one, and it is also worse than 
the situation desired.  
Since the first best equilibrium (in which individuals are cheated, in point B) cannot be reached 
by the monetary authority, in order to avoid the discretional behaviour it should be better to 
constraint on remaining in point A (a second best position) thanks to a commitment device.  
Under commitment, the central bank would inform the public that it will keep inflation at a 
predetermined level. Knowing that the central bank is capable of honouring its promises, the 
public will believe the central bank and expect the inflation rate to be pi-star. With no surprises, 
inflation will be pi-star, and output will attain its potential level, which is somewhat below its 
desired level. A policymaker who lacks the ability to commit to achieve an inflation target can’t 
do better, meaning that he can’t increase output enough at the expense of some surprise inflation 
and making everyone better off and all that occurs in the end is more inflation and no additional 
output. So, under both commitment and discretion, output remains at the potential level, but 
commitment achieves this result without any inflationary bias. 
This example makes clear the long-run benefits of commitment and of devising institutional 




The solution of this example of monetary policy is in line with the general principle of the 
optimal policy literature, according to which a policy implemented under commitment usually 
results -at least from an ex ante perspective- in a higher welfare than under discretion. 
 
 
Figure 4 - Representation of the Barro-Gordon model 
 
 
Supporters of discretion may argue that, differently from the ex-ante perspective, for which the 
solution with commitment dominates the one under discretion, ex-post it may be different. In 
fact, binding commitments could restrict the response of the policymaker to possible shocks 
that may arise in the economy. Thus, discretion could provide a major flexibility and 
effectiveness in facing unpredicted events. 
 Dotsey (2008) compares the response to shocks under commitment and discretion, and he does 
so in a monetary policy framework. According to the author, one of the major challenges of 
central banks should be the ability to respond to economic shocks and limit their effects on 
economic volatility, and that intuitively more discretion of the monetary policymakers should 
allow to respond to each situation as it arises while, promises to keep inflation at some targeted 
rate are constraining.  
However, Dotsey sustains that the notion for which commitment limits the policymaker from 




act on the basis of past promises allows a central bank operating under a policy of commitment 
to influence expectations in a desirable way that the discretionary planner cannot. Hence, a 
policymaker who can commit possesses another tool to work with, and not only can achieve all 
the outcomes of a policy under discretion, but it can also achieve outcomes unobtainable under 
discretion.: the committed policymaker cannot do worse than the discretionary planner is valid 
at least from an ex-ante perspective. On the contrary, the discretionary planner, because he 
makes decisions period by period and no promises, he does not have a similar ability to 
influence expectations.  
This point is considered in the famous paper written by Clarida et al (1999), who use a New 
Keynesian model to prove the gains deriving from commitment in the mitigation of the so-
called “stabilization bias”, for which inflation is more volatile and much harder to stabilize 
under discretion. This model is substantially characterized by two equations: the IS curve and 
the Phillips curve. As regards the IS curve, a high real interest rates imply lower demand for 
consumption and investment, while greater future economic activity implies both an increase 
in current consumption through a wealth effect and more investment.  
The model’s second component is the already mentioned Phillips curve that relates current 
inflation to future expected inflation and to the level of output. If future inflation is expected to 
be high, firms will want to raise prices more aggressively today, so that their prices do not get 
too far out of line with the behaviour of prices in general. This leads to greater inflation today. 
Also, when the level of output is high, firms’ costs of production rise, and as a result, firms pass 
on some of these additional costs to consumers. The result is higher inflation. The economy is 
in equilibrium when the level of the real interest rate and inflation implies that output demand 
is equal to output supply. 
Importantly, in the model, monetary policy can affect the level of output. Underpinning this 
model of the economy is the feature that prices and wages are costly to adjust. These costs may 
involve the resources used in acquiring information, the resources employed in figuring out 
exactly what the correct price or wage is, and the resources needed to change prices. These 
costs imply that firms and workers will not immediately and fully react to changes in monetary 
policy. As in our previous example, in which unanticipated changes in policy affected the 
economy, here anticipated changes in policy affect the economy as well. They do so because it 
takes time for the price system to fully respond to changes in policy. Thus, the central bank can 
move output and inflation around in response to an economic shock. 
To answer whether a discretionary policymaker or a committed policymaker perform better, 




and the economy respond to an aggregate supply shock. Figure 4 shows the model’s economic 
responses to a 1% shock to the inflation rate. Starting from the assumption that the public does 
not like inflation above the target level, and that the central bank’s objective is to to maximize 
public’s welfare, the policy response is a monetary contraction, i.e. the central bank raises the 
nominal interest rate (panel a). From the figure it is clear that, under discretion, the interest rate 
must be raised by approximately 50 basis points more than under commitment. As a result, 
output declines more under discretionary policy (panel b), but the effect of this more aggressive 
tightening under discretion has less influence on the inflation level (panel c). On the other hand, 
the policy under commitment experiences a smaller rise in inflation and a more rapid return of 
inflation to the target level, with less loss of output. Policy also does not need to be as aggressive 
because inflation doesn’t rise as much. 
Hence, the committed policymaker achieves the best outcome in both dynamics: less inflation 
increases due to the shock and less output loss, and all this by contemporaneously acting less 
aggressively. The explanation is that under commitment, individuals consider the 
policymaker’s promise to bring inflation down and to not exploit the output gains arising from 
inflation. As a result, expectations of inflation do not increase as much under commitment, and 
firms don’t raise their current prices as aggressively as they would in an environment 
characterized by discretion (panel d). 
The stability of inflation expectations under commitment implies that policy does not have to 
be as aggressive in order to bring down inflation, and as a result, output does not have to decline 
by as much. Therefore, contrary to intuition, the constraint of having to abide by past promises 
actually allows the committed policymaker to achieve superior economic outcomes in response 
to economic disturbances. 
Commitment’s superiority to discretion can be further characterized by investigating what kind 
of inflation and output trade-offs confront the economy under the two different types of policy. 
In this model, to some extent, the variability of inflation is inversely proportional to the 
variability output. Therefore, the more the policymaker tries to limit the volatility of inflation, 
the greater the volatility of output will be, and vice versa. It results that the policymaker 
possesses a whole menu of attainable combinations of output variability and inflation variability 
to choose from. Figure graphs the choices available to each type of policymaker. Because 
people dislike volatility in both output and inflation, points that lie closer to the origin are 
preferred. The principle for which under commitment the economy can achieve better outcomes 
than under discretion is represented in Figure 5, where the trade-off under commitment lies 




inflation, the committed policymaker can obtain less variability in output than the discretionary 
planner. Similarly, for any degree of volatility in output, the committed planner can generate 
less volatility in inflation.  
Thus, not only will the economy achieve a lower average rate of inflation under commitment, 









Figure 6 - Output and inflation trade-off 
 
 
There is a large body of literature that studies how a monetary authority will choose monetary 
policy under various assumptions about its objectives and the social welfare function. Barro 
and Gordon (1983), Kenneth Rogoff (1985a), Lars E. Svensson (1997) and the related literature 
suggest that governments should delegate monetary policy to a central bank that is instrument 
independent and appropriately conservative. A central bank is instrument independent if it has 
full control over the instruments of monetary policy; by appropriately conservative, this 
literature means that the central bank's output and/or inflation targets should be lower than the 
socially optimal ones and that the central bank should put more weight on inflation stabilization 
and less on output stabilization than society does. Central bank independence and conservatism 
eliminate the inflation bias of monetary policy that results from the incentive to exploit surprise 
inflation to raise output in the short run above its natural level, which is typically assumed to 
be inefficiently low. 
 
As mentioned in chapter I, the demonstration effects of successful rule-based monetary policies 
conducted by independent central banks inspired the adoption of rules also in the domain of 




the hands of their fiscal policymakers by putting in place fiscal rules and restrictions that limit 
the degree of fiscal policy discretion. 
 
2.3 Commitment versus Discretion: Fiscal policy 
The “commitment versus discretion” approach applied to the case of monetary policy (Kydland 
and Prescott, 1977; Barro and Gordon, 1983) supports the use of fixed rules, which eliminate 
the inflationary bias generated by the authority’s incentive to behave opportunistically for trying 
to stabilize output above the natural level rather than commit themselves to maintain a low and 
stable rate of inflation. Forward-looking, rational agents understand this incentive and 
anticipate the behaviour of monetary authorities and the correct rate of future inflation that will 
prevail in future. The result of this game between rational agents and monetary authorities is 
the achievement of a suboptimal (third best) equilibrium where output is at its natural level and 
the rate of inflation is higher than under commitment. Hence, monetary policy is dynamically 
inconsistent, and this provides a strong argument in favour of a rule constraining the central 
bank to pursue a low and stable inflation rate.  
Less interest has been put in considering the Kydland-Prescott framework of dynamic 
inconsistency to fiscal policy framework. Similarly to monetary policy’s inflation bias, even 
fiscal policy may suffer by a bias due to time inconsistency: the so-called “deficit bias”, which 
is the tendency for the government to rise public debt, as already said in chapter I.  
In particular, there may be for the government the incentive to over-use fiscal deficits as a tool 
to raise aggregate demand, and therefore output and employment in the short run, since prices 
and wages are slow to adjust to unanticipated shocks. This mechanism is similar to the one that 
causes the inflation bias for monetary policy under unconstrained discretionary policymaking. 
In equilibrium, when rational expectations have adjusted to the “opportunistic” government 
behaviour, such fiscal policy results only in deficits, without any output and employment 
benefits. This phenomenon has given a new stimulus to the economic debate about debt 
sustainability and the opportunity to adopt commitment approach rather than discretion in the 
conduct of fiscal policy, since as theory suggest, the equilibrium that results under discretion 
generally implies a lower welfare than the case in which the government can credibly commit 
itself ex ante to a specific policy.  
If rules can be made credible in the sense that the government is expected to follow them, 
“rules” give higher welfare than discretion. 
An attempt to justify the introduction of a fiscal rule using a time-inconsistency approach has 




authority have different target levels of the same two objectives (output and inflation). The 
authors show that commitment by both authorities is optimal, so that discretion in fiscal policy 
always generates inferior outcomes.  
A paper by Bianchi and Menegatti (2012) deals with the dynamic inconsistency of fiscal policy 
and it manages to provide a possible explanation for the deficit bias. These authors consider a 
government that pursues two different goals: output and debt stabilization, under the constraint 
given by the equation describing debt dynamics and the hypothesis of the existence of a risk 
premium on the yield of public bonds tied to the possibility of a default.  
They label Y* as the desired level of output and Δb* as the optimal value of debt dynamics and 
they assume that: 
𝑌∗  >  𝑌𝑡 
because of the existence of distortions in the tax system and in the labour market; and that: 
 𝛥𝑏
∗  =  0  
as sufficient condition for debt sustainability. 
They also suppose that the output is an increasing function of the level of deficit, namely: 
 Yt = f(Dt) 
The optimal level of deficit, labelled as 𝐷𝑜𝑝𝑡 is the one that permits to achieve the desired 
output, which may or not coincide with the necessary deficit that insure debt stabilization (𝐷𝑠𝑡). 
Now, if the target level of output is supposed to be greater than the actual output, then: 
𝑌∗ > 𝑓(𝐷𝑠𝑡),  
which introduces a trade-off between the goal of reaching the desired output level and that of 
stabilizing public debt.  
It implies that the optimal level of deficit, 𝐷𝑜𝑝𝑡 is actually higher than the level of deficit 
sufficient for the debt stabilization 𝐷𝑠𝑡, meaning that the government chooses to increase the 
deficit in order to push output closer to its desired level. 
This behaviour, which stems from the assumed trade-off between the two conflicting objectives 
of output and debt stabilization is the source of dynamic inconsistency. 
In the case of discretion, private agents assume that the government will pursue public debt 
stabilization and hence choose the subsequent level of deficit given government’s preferences 
summarized by by the loss function 𝐿(𝐷𝑡) .  
In the case in which the government announcement is trusted (the so- called case of “fooling”), 
the Government announcement of debt stabilization is assumed to be believed. The Government 
then will choose the optimal level of deficit 𝐷𝑡 under the condition 𝛥𝑏




However, since 𝑌∗ > 𝑓(𝐷𝑠𝑡), we have that the deficit under fooling (𝐷𝑓) is higher than 𝐷𝑠𝑡  . 
This means that agents expectations about debt stabilization (Δb = 0 ) are wrong, since the 
Government choice implies that Δb > 0, meaning that it prefers to reach the desired level of 
output at the expense of an increase in deficit. 
On the contrary, if agents are forward-looking and rational, as prescribed by Kydland and 
Prescott, then, 𝐷𝑓 cannot be an equilibrium level of 𝐷𝑡 . 
In fact, if agents have rational expectations, they will not trust the Government announcement 
and will instead anticipate its actual choice and behaviour: agents will anticipate the 
growth of public debt and will ask for a risk premium that will increase the interest rate paid on 
public bonds. Such increase in interest payment will raise the Government loss with respect to 
the case of fooling. 
To see whether commitment may reduce or not the Government loss, they compute analytically 
the difference between the government loss function under commitment 𝐿(𝐷𝑐) and under 
discretion 𝐿(𝐷𝑑)3 and they find an uncommon result: commitment to debt stabilization is 
superior to discretion only when the public debt–GDP is higher than a certain threshold. If the 
debt-output ratio in the economy is small, then discretion is preferable, while, on the contrary, 
commitment is a better alternative for highly indebted economies. 
This occurs because the two choices involve differentiated advantages: discretion entails larger 
interest payments due to the risk premium but a level of output closer to the desired value, while 
commitment implies lower interest payments, due to the absence of the risk premium, but also 
a lower level of output. 
It is interesting to notice that their conclusion partly differs from that obtained in the 
application of the dynamic inconsistency approach to monetary policy. As pointed out by 
Barro and Gordon (1983), in the case of monetary policy, discretion generates an inflation bias 
with an unchanged output, thus, in that context, commitment is always preferable (the second-
best solution). In the case of fiscal policy, the difference in the conclusion is due to the 
fact that in their model the equilibrium level of output is higher under discretion because of the 
positive effects of fiscal policy on production. 
Hence, in general commitment can either reduce or increase the loss function: if the debt-output 
ratio in the economy is small, then discretion is preferable, while, on the contrary, 
commitment is a better alternative for highly indebted economies. 
 





Badinger and Reuter (2015) summarize many other factors that exacerbate the bias towards 
deficit under discretion. In particular they individuate: 
(i) Common pool theory, according to which many decision makers involved in the budgetary 
process may be lobbied by or depend on specific interest groups. As a consequence, the 
likelihood of spending and large deficits increases the greater the decision makers’ conflict of 
interests.  
(ii) Information asymmetry: decision makers usually have more information on the true fiscal 
position than voters, which can be used for (promising) spending increases or tax cuts before 
elections, creating a political business cycle (see Brender and Drazen, 2005; Shi and Svensson, 
2006). 
(iii) Impatience and short-sightedness: Governments tend to discount future events (e.g., future 
public spending) or future election periods at a higher rate than voters because politicians may 
lose their office in the short-run (see for example Woo, 2005) 
(iv) Political competition: Governments, anticipating the possibility of being replaced in the 
future, have an incentive to reduce the room for fiscal manoeuvre for future governments by 
accumulating debt (Persson and Svensson, 1989; Alesina and Tabellini, 1990) . 
For all these reasons, unconstrained fiscal policy is likely to result in excessively high deficits, 
below of what would be socially optimal.  
Another rationale for binding the budgetary process, unrelated to the deficit bias, has been put 
forward by Fathàs and Mihov (2006). The find that macroeconomic volatility is linked to 
discretionary fiscal policy. They argue that fiscal constraints lead to lower volatility with respect 
to discretionary fiscal policy, lower output volatility and thereby lower macroeconomic 
volatility.  
 
Another strand of literature focuses on a different issue in the optimal fiscal policy literature: 
the distribution of the tax burden between labour income and capital income, which is different 
depending on the degree to which the government can commit to the announced policy. 
However in this fiscal policy literature it holds that a planner with full-commitment can -in 
general- achieve a higher welfare than a planner with no-commitment, and the reason behind 
this is that a planner with a better commitment technology can always mimic the allocations of 
a planner with a worse commitment technology, but the converse is not true. 
The problem consists in the decision of the policymaker between the labour and the capital 




and labour income. At time t-1 the government announced a certain tax policy of the private 
sector made investment decisions believing the government. It is a well-known 
result from Ramsey (1927) that optimal taxation requires higher rates on less elastic tax 
base. This means that since the tax base of capital income is totally inelastic at time t (since 
it was determined by investment at t-1), it would be optimal for the government to tax capital 
at the maximum level. However a rational private agents understands that capital income will 
be taxed heavily, and this would discourage them to make any investment at t-1 (𝑥𝑡−1 = 0), 
which would result in devastating outcome for society as a whole, due to the inability of the 
government to commit to tax policy.  
However, if the government is able to commit to a certain level of capital tax rate. say 30%, 
then the private sector would rationally expect it and will make investments accordingly 
(𝑥𝑡−1 > 0).  




Hence, the commitment hypothesis certainly improves the predictability of the fiscal policy 
choice, by reducing the uncertainty regarding the future capital tax rate. This allows private 
agents to invest a higher portion on their wealth on investment, closer to the optimal investment 
level that they would achieve under full certainty. An allocation of private agents’ wealth 
between consumption and investment closer to the optimal allocation under certainty permits 
them to achieve an overall welfare level which is higher with respect to the level of welfare 
reachable under discretion. One of the most famous results in Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) 
is that under the assumption of full-commitment, the optimal tax rate on capital income does 
tend to zero in the long-run and all the tax burden falls on labour. Their model solves the 
government’s problem that seeks to finance an exogenous stream of government expenses 
through distortionary, flat-rate taxes on capital and labour earnings. The government’s objective 
is to maximize the representative household’s welfare subject to raising the required revenue 
and, as just said, the government has the ability to fully commit to future tax rates. However, 




environment without commitment, because – as said- the policymaker (or better the government 
in this case) may be tempted to raise revenues by future levies on capital.  
The problem in which the government chooses its policy under discretion is examined by, 
among others, Benhabib and Rustichini (1986). They consider a model with competitive agents 
and a benevolent government that must tax capital and labour income to finance an exogenous 
stream of government spending in an environment without commitment. This government 
selects the optimal time-consistent taxes by choosing the policy that maximizes the individual’s 
welfare subject to the standard feasibility and implementability constraints and an incentive 
compatibility constraint that embeds the future governments’ incentives. This constraint says 
that, for all future governments, the welfare value of continuing with the policy that the current 
government announces must be at least as large as the welfare value of deviating from that 
policy. Any policy that satisfies this constraint is clearly time-consistent. For simplification 
purposes, the authors restrict attention to economies where governments cannot issue debt. In 
this context, they obtain that optimal capital taxes, under discretion, may be different from zero 
at steady state. In particular, they show that once capital is accumulated, it is sunk, and taxing 
capital is no longer distortionary. Hence, once capital is accumulated, a policymaker under 
discretion would set a capital income tax greater than zero.  
A more recent paper by Debortoli and Nunes (2010) deals with the classical fiscal policy 
problem of optimal distribution of the taxation burden between labour and capital income too, 
but it points out that both the commitment and the discretion’s approaches used to tackle 
optimal policy problems are, to some extent, unrealistic. 
In fact, the commitment approach doesn’t take into consideration the possibility that the 
policymaker may default on past promises, while the discretionary approach rules out the 
possibility that a policymaker can effectively keep a promise, without reneging it at some point. 
That is why they introduce the certainly more realistic setting of “loose commitment”, in which 
some policymaker’s promises are fulfilled, while others are not or occasionally revised in 
itinere. This approach goes beyond the binary view of commitment and discretion and it better 
reflects, as mentioned, some situations that happens in real life, like for example the fact that a 
government may want to fulfil its promises but doesn’t care of previous government’s promises, 
or that even if governments commit to future plans, they may be obliged to default on past 
promises because some particular events arise like induced political instability or increased 




The alternation of governments has been considered originally by Alesina and Tabellini (1990) 
and Persson and Svensson (1989): it concerns the limited time span of governments, which 
implies that a government cannot commit to its successors, so that the presence of political 
turnover constitute a natural limitation of the policymakers’ commitment horizon. Their time 
inconsistency hypothesis states that when a government is uncertain of re-election, or knows 
with certainty that it will not be re-elected, it will want to increase the debt above what is 
socially optimal to strategically influence the options of a future government, which may not 
want to spend according to the preferences of the present one. 
However, back to the Debortoli and Nunes’ loose commitment, the authors state that current 
promises will be kept only with some probability, otherwise they will be revised. The authors 
characterize the properties of labour and capital income taxes under this setting and they find 
out that even though the probability ok keeping promises is high, such tax rates are close to the 
values that prevail under the non-commitment assumption. Hence, the probability, even a small 
one, of re-optimization of the optimal policy largely affect the final outcome. In particular, 
contrary to Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986), who sustain that under full-commitment it is 
optimal not to tax capital in the long-run, Debortoli and Nunes find that under loose 
commitment the average capital tax rate is positive. 
The authors analyse the differences in the general level of welfare under the three cases until 
now considered: the result is in line with what said before, and namely that a planner with full-
commitment can achieve, in general, a higher welfare than a planner with no-commitment. 
Debortoli and Nunes emphasise this concept by explaining that a planner with a better 
commitment technology is always able to mimic the allocations of a planner with a worse 
commitment technology. They further investigate this point by computing how the welfare -
measured in consumption equivalent variation-changes by changing the level of commitment 
(labelled π) from absence of commitment (π=0) to full-commitment (π=1) with 0 < π ≤ 1. 
According to their calibration, from no-commitment to full-commitment, the welfare 
improvement reflects into an increase in private consumption of 3.60%. Interestingly, at quite 
high level of commitment (say π = 0.75), the welfare gains with respect to no-commitment are 
1.88% of consumption, which amounts to roughly 50% of the total gains of passing from no-
commitment to full-commitment, meaning that most of the gains from enhancing commitment 





Figure 7 - Welfare gains commitment 
 
 
Another, more recent paper by Clymo and Lanteri (2020) also aims to mitigate the unrealistic 
treats characterising the full commitment and the no-commitment approaches . The authors 
point out that the assumptions underlying FC and NC policies appear hard to reconcile with the 
fact that policymakers are in power for a limited amount of time, inherit their predecessors' 
plans, and they possess a degree of commitment over a finite future horizon. 
That’s why they study the fiscal policy when successive benevolent governments inherit the 
plans of their predecessors and formulate plans for a finite future horizon. They call this 
formulation “Limited-Time Commitment” (LTC), which implies that governments cannot 
commit into the infinite future, but instead only possess the ability to commit for a finite period 
of time. To study the effects deriving from different degrees of commitment on welfare, the 
authors exploit numerical methods and study a specification of their benchmark model 
calibrated to the US economy. Their key finding is that, even in the absence of equivalence 
between LTC and FC, a short commitment horizon leads to substantial welfare gains relative 
to the absence of any fiscal commitment. They assume that labour supply is inelastic, and 
governments choose the level of government spending to be financed using only capital income 
taxes and subject to a balanced budget rule. 
The source of time inconsistency in this model is that government spending, which is valued 
by households, can only be financed with capital income taxation, which distorts the incentives 
to invest. In fact, governments have the incentive to promise low public good provision ex-ante 
to encourage investment, for then raising capital taxes ex-post to fund higher government 
spending. The authors compare steady-state allocations, policies and welfare when the 
government has FC, NC, and LTC with one, two, and three years of commitment. The model 
shows two key results. 
First, increasing the number of periods of commitment with LTC quickly brings the equilibrium 




number of periods of commitment. Clymo and Lanteri also estimate the welfare losses relative 
to FC as the fraction of steady-state consumption that would make the representative household 
indifferent between living in these economies with various degree of commitment and living in 
the FC economy. From FC to NC, the permanent consumption falls by 9.3%. What strikes is 
that just three years of commitment are enough to bring the model remarkably close to FC, with 
a recover of two thirds of the welfare losses from NC.  
Secondly, they find that the largest welfare gains from limited commitment are from 
introducing the first period of commitment. Over a third of the welfare loss can be recovered 
by imposing a single year of commitment to fiscal policy. As extra periods of commitment are 
added, welfare continues to increase, although at a decreasing marginal rate: the marginal 
welfare gain from adding the third year of commitment is 37% of the gain from adding the first 
year of commitment. Thus, we find that the largest marginal welfare gains come from the ability 
to commit over short horizons, and that the marginal gains from longer commitment horizons 
are smaller. 
Related to this, they suppose initially that the government has no ability to commit and then 
they investigate the effects of the introduction of an unexpected constitutional reform that 
imposes fiscal commitment: the governments must announce policies one year in advance, and 
always respect these plans. In order to evaluate the effects of this reform, they analyse the whole 
transition path to the LTC steady state. Figure 8 shows the paths of capital, private consumption, 
public consumption and the tax rate. The solid red line shows the transition of interest, and the 
dashed blue line illustrates the counterfactual NC steady state. Capital gradually increases in 
response to the lower taxes under LTC. Interestingly, the LTC government decides to overshoot 
the decrease in taxes (and hence spending) at the beginning of the transition in order to foster 
faster capital accumulation. The overall welfare benefit of this reform, accounting for the 












3 Empirical analysis 
In a perfect world of fully informed policymakers exclusively oriented to achieve the maximum 
level of social welfare, complete discretion would enable them to optimally respond to changing 
circumstances at any time. Instead, the real world is characterized by information asymmetries 
and time-inconsistency. Moreover, the policy behaviour is notoriously influenced by many 
other considerations than the pure social welfare maximization. This is why , in many 
democratic systems policy discretion has been constrained in order to prevent undesirable 
policy outcomes. As already explained, a clear example of effort to tie the hands of fiscal 
policymakers is the introduction of numerical rules expressed in terms of deficit caps, public 
debt limits, and expenditure ceilings (see Kopits and Symansky, 1998). But, as pointed by 
Beetsema at al. (2018), it is true that while many countries subject fiscal decisions to formal 
policy rules, it is also true that weak compliance and widespread attempts to flout fiscal rules 
have raised doubts about their effectiveness. This led more and more countries to introduce new 
institutional mechanisms, in the form fiscal councils, to better anchor future fiscal decisions in 
sustainable fiscal trajectories (see Chapter I). 
The cost of discretion is that the equilibrium that results implies low welfare, lower than the 
case in which the government could credibly commit itself ex ante to a specific policy. If rules 
can be made credible in the sense that the government is expected to follow them, “rules” give 
higher welfare than discretion.  
Hence, commitment is said to be welfare enhancing. Anyway, it is not perfectly clear how fiscal 
rules, to interpret as a commitment device, can bring an improvement of welfare.  
This chapter proposes an application of commitment in fiscal policy. By using fiscal rules and 
fiscal commitment as commitment devices, the objective of this chapter is to explore whether 
their use lead to some beneficial effects and how they may translate into a welfare increase.  
To analyse the potential impact of a rule-based fiscal framework on fiscal policy, I will study 
the effect of fiscal rules and fiscal councils on fiscal performance in section I, and their impact 








3.1 SECTION I: FISCAL PERFORMANCE 
The adoption of fiscal rules has been considered as the instrument of choice to deal with deficit 
bias. As noted above, most of the literature on fiscal institutions implicitly accepts the validity 
of what we term the “commitment” hypothesis: that is the presumption that rules or institutions 
shape policymakers’ incentives in a way that leads them to mimic a socially-optimal solution, 
better than what would result under complete discretion and people form their expectations of 
future policy on the basis of the known incentive of the government to deviate from 
announcements. In other words, institutional changes, including the adoption of a rules-based 
framework, or the setting up of an independent agency is assumed to be followed by an 
improvement in fiscal performance. 
In this section, such improvements in fiscal performance have been translated into the 
hypothesis that more stringent rules framework and institutions should be associated with 
higher primary balances on average. This is consistent with the idea that a higher commitment 
in fiscal policy leads to a better fiscal discipline, differently from a discretionary fiscal policy 
which is more likely to suffer of the biases deriving from fiscal indiscipline, like for example 
the bias towards deficit. Hence the expectation is that countries with a higher level of 
commitment, namely with more stringent rules and an independent fiscal council in place, will 
have on average better general government primary balance than countries with lower levels of 
commitment. 
3.1.1  The European Commission Fiscal Rule Index 
Before turning to the examination of the impact of fiscal rules and fiscal councils on general 
government primary balance, here is a brief description on the index used to measure the 
strength of fiscal rules in place for every Euro Area country . The European Commission's (EC) 
allows the access to a detailed dataset containing information on domestic fiscal rules in force 
for period 1990-2018 for 28 EU countries. In the dataset, each numerical fiscal rule is classified 
as either a budget balance, debt, expenditure, and revenue rules. In addition, the dataset 
specifies for each rule the governmental level in which it applies (central, regional, and local, 
general government, and social security). But what it is most important for the analysis is that 
for each rule, the EC assigns a numerical “Fiscal Rule Strength Index” (FRSI). This index is a 
weighted average of five rule criteria: i) the statutory base of the rule, ii) how much room the 
rule allows in setting or revising objectives, iii) the nature and independence of the monitoring 
and enforcement body, iv) the enforcement mechanisms of the rule, and v) the visibility of the 
rule in the media. Then, on the basis of the FRSI for each rule, a comprehensive time-varying 




fraction of general government finances covered by the rule. If only one rule is in force in a 
country in a given year, the simple product between the FRSI and the fraction of finances 
covered is enough to determine the FRI for that year. However, if multiple rules apply to the 
same government sector, they are ranked by the product of the fraction of government finances 
they cover and their FRSIs; the strongest rule covering each government sector is given a weight 
of 1, the second 1/2, the third 1/3, and so on in order to take into account the decreasing marginal 
effect of multiple rules applying to the same governmental level. The FRI results - in this case- 
from the sum of the weighted rules.4 
3.1.2 Data and Empirical set-up 
The empirical analysis is performed on a cross-country panel data covering 22 European 
countries5 over the period 2005-2018. Data on all the variables used are taken from the 
European Commission website6.  
From a preliminary look at the data, it results that the simple correlation between the average 
Fiscal Rule Index (FRI) and the average general government primary balance is positive and 
equal to 0.43, suggesting that -in general- countries with stronger fiscal rules in place are 
characterized by higher primary balance (see Figure 9). This first result is consistent with the 
hypothesis stated above for which fiscal rules, as commitment devices, improve the fiscal 
performance through the enhancement of fiscal discipline. Figure 9 pictures however a simple 
correlation: it is worth noting that it could be that more fiscally conservative countries that pays 






4 Namely: FRI= (rule weight) *(coverage of general government finances) *(FRSI). See also Frenkel et al. 
(2012) 
5 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia ,Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom 
 







To investigate further the impact of fiscal rules and fiscal councils on general government 
primary balances , we rely on the model proposed by Debrun and Kinda (2014): 
 
𝑃𝐵𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛴𝑘𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜑1𝐹𝑅𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑2𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (1)  
where the dependent variable is the general government primary budget balance (PB) for 
country i at time t , which is regressed on its one-year lagged value (𝑃𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1) to allow for 
persistence, a vector of covariates (𝑥𝑘), the fiscal rule index (𝐹𝑅𝐼) of country i at time t, a 
dummy variable for Fiscal Councils (𝐹𝐶) equal 1 if the country has instituted a fiscal council 
and 0 otherwise, and finally the year fixed effect (𝜆𝑡) and the error term 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. The vector of 
covariates 𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1 includes some standard determinants of the general government primary 
balance, such as the lagged gross debt to capture long-term solvency constraint, and the lagged 
output gap to control for the cyclicality of fiscal policy. The estimation of the dynamic 


















































Figure 9 - Correlation between the average Fiscal Rule Index (FRI) and the 





Table 1 shows that OLS point estimates reveal a positive correlation between fiscal rules and 
the primary balance. The coefficient 𝜑1 is positive and significant, suggesting an improvement 
in the primary balance equal to 0.407 percent of GDP when countries have fiscal rules in place. 
More precisely it indicates that countries with better designed and stringent fiscal rules exhibit 
a stronger fiscal performance. This result is in line with the past literature, see for example 
Debrun et al. (2008) who found a statistically significant, robust, and causal relationship 
between their fiscal rule index and the cyclically-adjusted primary balance, using a sample of 
European Union countries. It is consistent also with more recent papers: see for instance 
Heinemann et al. (2018) and Caselli at al. (2020), who show that countries with fiscal rules 
have, on average, higher fiscal balances with respect to countries without fiscal rules. 
In addition to the positive relation between fiscal rules and fiscal performance, the results also 
suggest that the mere existence of fiscal councils is conducive to stronger fiscal balances. The 
coefficient 𝜑2 is, in fact positive, and significant. According to the results, the presence of a 
fiscal council should improve the primary balance of 0.834 % of GDP: this suggests that, in 
general, fiscal councils effectively complement and reinforce the discipline-enhancing role of 
numerical fiscal rules. In fact, the potential impact of fiscal councils when the fiscal framework, 
particularly fiscal targets and objectives, are clearly defined through numerical rules, is strong. 
The existence of numerical fiscal rules could indeed facilitate the task of the fiscal council by 
providing a simple and transparent benchmark to assess fiscal performance.  
 
This is a point in favour of our initial commitment hypothesis for which fiscal rules improve 
countries’ fiscal performance. A greater fiscal performance surely implies a minor propension 
towards deficit bias. This can consequently lead countries to control their debts and keep them 
in a sustainable path.  
Debt sustainability for a country has for sure positive effects: it first helps in reducing 
macroeconomic uncertainty. To exactly quantify the impact of a lower macroeconomic 
uncertainty on social welfare is hard. Here we limit to say that lower macroeconomic 
uncertainty combined with better fiscal discipline allow a country to gain higher credibility at 
the international level, which may convert in a reduction of the cost of debt for example. In the 
world of private agents, economic theory suggests that uncertainty has a detrimental effect on 
economic activity by giving agents the incentive to postpone investment, consumption and 
employment decisions until uncertainty is resolved, and by pushing up the cost of capital 




the real-option value to waiting, leading to a dramatic reduction of investment rates. Minor 
uncertainty and the conduction of a sound fiscal policy can make private agents closer to invest 
and consume at their optimal level, by reducing their portion of precautionary savings that 
would certainly be larger under uncertainty.  
 
Table 1 - Fiscal Rules, Fiscal councils and Fiscal Performance 
Ols results 
Dependent variable: Primary Balance (i,t) 

























Time dummies Yes 
Observations 458 
Adjusted R2 0.648 
***significant at 0.01, **significant at 0.05, 












3.2 SECTION II: FORECASTING PERFORMANCE 
3.2.1 Fiscal forecasts bias towards overoptimism 
The best-known macroeconomic example on time inconsistency is probably the “inflation bias” 
result of Barro and Gordon (1983) reported in Chapter II.  
In that example, the starting condition is that the target inflation rate is zero and people also 
expect a zero-inflation rate too. So, the government has the incentive to choose an inflation rate 
above zero in order to lower unemployment below the natural rate and move it closer to the 
socially optimal target. But private agents anticipate this incentive and won’t believe that the 
zero-inflation announcement will be respected. The result is that in equilibrium the inflation 
rate is sub-optimally high. If the government could have credibly committed itself to respect 
the zero inflation, not only the welfare would be higher, as already pointed out, but also the 
government policy would have been, from the beginning, more predictable and without 
possibility of being affected or distorted by some incentives. As it results that the commitment 
solution should increase the predictability of inflation policy, in this section we explore the 
possibility that credible fiscal rules and institutions, in their quality of commitment instruments, 
may also improve welfare by increasing the predictability of fiscal policy. To do so, we 
investigate the effect that fiscal rules and institutions have on the quality of budget balance 
forecasts. Countries with a lower degree of fiscal commitment -that is with higher discretion- 
are expected to be more subject to the incentive to deviate from the initial fiscal plan. Deviations 
from the original plan will make their fiscal policy less predictable. Hence, the hypothesis is 
that a lower predictability will translates into higher forecast errors. On the contrary, countries 
characterized by a high level of fiscal commitment will tend to “stick” with the plans, and 
consequently the forecast error should be lower due to a higher predictability of the fiscal 
policy.  
Econometric studies have already shown that government budget forecasts in many countries 
are overly optimistic on average. Jonung and Larch (2006) find that budget agencies in the EU 
systematically overestimate the economic growth rate and, as a consequence, the other fiscal 
aggregates.  
Similarly, Beetsma et al (2009) find that realized budget balances among Euro Area countries 
on average fall short of official ex ante plans, as well as Marinheiro (2010) finds that the 




The objective of this section is to explore the effect of fiscal rules and fiscal councils on the 
overoptimistic bias of fiscal forecasts. In addition, the purpose is also to investigate which 
beneficial effect may derive by an alleviation of this bias. 
3.2.2 Data  
The data for this empirical analysis come from the European Commission’ s economic 
forecasts, which are published at least twice a year (spring and autumn) in the European 
Commission’s website. These fully-fledged forecasts concentrate on the Member States, the 
euro area and the EU, but also include the outlook for the candidate countries as well as some 
of the world’s major economies.  
In general, “spring forecasts” extend to the current and the next year, while “autumn forecasts” 
contain forecasts for the current and the two following years; both cover about 180 variables. 
For the empirical analysis, spring forecasts made at year t for year t+1 for the general 
government primary balance have been used. The sample covers 22 euro area countries for 
period 2005-2015. 
The primary balance forecasts were necessary to compute the primary balance forecast error 
(PBFE). The PBFE is defined as the forecasted primary balance minus actual primary balance. 
More specifically, as in Frenkel and Schreger (2012), the 𝑃𝐵𝐹𝐸𝑡+1 equals to the difference 
between the forecast of the general government primary balance made in year t for year t+1 




𝑃𝐵𝐹𝐸𝑡+1 =  𝐹𝑃𝐵𝑡+1,𝑡 −  𝑃𝐵𝑡+1 
 
When the forecast error is positive, it means that the forecast has been too optimistic, that is to 
say the forecasted primary balance has been higher than what it actually realized for the 
following year. Vice versa, if the forecast error is negative, it means that forecasts have been 
overly pessimistic or -at least- prudent.  
The Mean Forecast Error (MFE) measures the average error by which forecasts differ from 
outcomes. It shows whether systematic over- or under-prediction is present. Since positive and 












Figure 10 plots the mean of the one-year primary balance forecast error for the Euro Area 
countries in the sample for period 2005-2018.  
 




Figure 11 plots instead the mean primary balance forecast error by year for Euro Area countries. 
The figure shows that during the majority of the sample period, especially during period of 
crisis and uncertainty, mean forecast errors tended to be up-ward biased.  
 



















































































































































































3.2.3 Empirical set-up  
The reference model for this empirical section comes again from Debrun and Kinda (2014). 
The objective of the model is to investigate the impact of fiscal rules and fiscal councils on the 
forecast error. The dependent variable is the above-mentioned Primary Balance Forecast error 
(PBFE) for country i and year t, regressed on the Output gap (OG) for country i at time t-1, the 
EC Fiscal Rule Index (FRI) and the dummy variable for the presence of fiscal councils (FC), 
both contemporaneous to the dependent variable (at time t and for country i). In addition, the 
year fixed effects necessary to control for common time-varying shocks is included (𝜆𝑡). Hence, 
the equation to be estimated is the following: 
𝑃𝐵𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑂𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜑1𝐹𝑅𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑2𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (2) 




As Table 2 shows, the more fiscal rules are likely to bind (as captured by an increase in the 
fiscal rule index), the less the budget balance forecast are optimistic. This is confirmed by the 
coefficient 𝜑1 , that appears negative and statistically significant at the 5% level.  
The presence of independent fiscal councils further lowers the bias in the primary balance 
forecasts, even though this is confirmed by a negative coefficient (𝜑2) statistically significant 
at only the 10% level. 
Over-optimistic budget forecasts are very dangerous because they may lead to an 
underestimation of budget deficits. It means that budget deficits are usually expected lower than 
what will actually be. Over-optimism in budget deficit forecasting have unfavourable 
consequences: as a matter of fact, if deficit forecasts are underestimated, then governments will 
have lower incentive to consolidate the budget and deficit will be higher than what could have 
been with a proper consolidation based on unbiased forecasts. The bias towards over-optimism 
of fiscal forecasts may be a candidate cause of the often-mentioned deficit bias. Fiscal rules and 
fiscal councils, through their ability in reducing over-optimism in official fiscal forecasts, 
allows again to alleviate the deficit bias and bring the beneficial effects descripted in the 
previous section. More generally, regarding the sound public finances debate, Jonung et al. 
(2006) show that budget forecast errors have contributed to the increase of structural deficits in 
the European Union countries. Repeated over-estimation of revenues and/or underestimation of 




burden of a higher public debt may decrease the funds available for the provision of public 
goods, with a consequent negative impact on social welfare. 
 
Table 2 Fiscal Rules, Fiscal Councils and Primary Balance Forecast errors.  
Ols results 
Dependent variable: Primary Balance 

















Time dummies Yes 
Observations 241 
Adjusted R2  0.369 
***significant at 0.01, **significant at 
0.05, *significant at 0.1 
 
3.2.5 The accuracy of Forecasts 
While the previous regression highlights the role of fiscal rules and councils in reducing the 
distortions in budgetary forecasting, the next specification aims at assessing whether fiscal rules 
and fiscal councils – considered as before as commitment devices- can improve the information 
contents of official forecasts or equivalently, their accuracy. More specifically, in this case 
“accuracy” is meant as the closeness, in quantitative terms, of the forecast in comparison to the 
actual outcome. The chosen metric for forecast accuracy is the mean absolute forecast error. 
The Mean Absolute Forecast Error (MAFE) measures the average absolute difference between 




it represents a more accurate measure of the average forecast error than the Mean Forecast Error 








Figure 12 provides a visual representation of the one year-ahead Mean Forecast Error for Euro 
Area Countries in the sample for period 2005-2018 
 
Figure 12 Mean of 1-year ahead absolute primary balance forecast error for Euro Area 
countries 
 
From Figure 13, instead, an initial descriptive analysis of data shows that the correlation 
between the mean absolute forecast error (MAFE) by country and the average Fiscal Rule Index 
by country is negative (-0.23). Though the correlation is not highly negative, it suggests that 
the higher is the Fiscal Rule Index – that is to say the more stringent the rules are for a certain 

























































































































































Figure 13 - Correlation between the mean absolute forecast error (MAFE) by country and 
the average Fiscal Rule Index by country 
 
Another intuition from the descriptive analysis is visible in Figure 14, and it regards the ability 
of Fiscal Councils in favouring the precision of fiscal forecasts. The presence of a fiscal council 
is associated with a reduction of almost one percentage point of GDP on average for general 
government primary balance absolute forecasts errors. 
 

























































The corresponding regression model is the following: 
 
𝐴𝐵𝑆(𝑃𝐵𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑂𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜑1𝐹𝑅𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑2𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (3)  
 
where 𝐴𝐵𝑆(𝑃𝐵𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡) represents the absolute value of 𝑃𝐵𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡. The estimation of the dynamic 
specification (3) is done using a standard Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimator. 
3.2.6 Results 
Results of regression (3) are presented in Table 3. The strength of fiscal rules does not appear 
to fully translate into more accurate primary balance forecasts. In fact, the estimated coefficient 
of the fiscal rule index is negative, though not statistically significant. 
The dummy variable for the presence of a fiscal councils has the expected negative coefficient, 
meaning that the presence of a fiscal council tends to favour the production of more precise and 
accurate forecasts. This is coherent with the fact that one of the main fiscal councils’ remits is 
the preparation of independent and precise forecasts. 
In order to be effective, fiscal policy decisions must be based on accurate monitoring and 
forecasting. The ability to dispose of accurate fiscal forecasts favours a more effective and 
conscious policy choice, above all in the case in which such forecasts suggest the need for a 
timely corrective action. In addition, private agents’ expectations and behaviours are influenced 
by forecasts, which permit them to have a more shaped idea of their near future. This, again, 
allows them to make better informed decisions as regards their optimal level of investment and 





Table 3 - Fiscal Rules, Fiscal Councils and Absolute Primary Balance Forecast errors. 
Ols results 
Dependent variable: Absolute Primary 

















Time dummies Yes 
Observations 241 
Adjusted R2  0.369 
***significant at 0.01, **significant at 








This thesis underlines the growing interest attributed to the concept of fiscal discipline and its 
essential role in the containment of governments’ propension toward the so-called “deficit 
bias”. Starting from the 1970s several advanced and emerging countries embarked into 
medium-large fiscal consolidations programs in order to reduce or stabilize their sovereign debt, 
even though few of them proved their efficacy. For example, as reported by IMF (1996), in the 
period between 1970 and 1995, out of the 74 fiscal consolidation’s attempts, only 14 
documented cases resulted in a successful fiscal adjustment in industrial countries.  
In the 1980s and 1990s the revolution in monetary policy institutions and rules has inspired a 
paradigm shift also in fiscal frameworks. from 1990s onwards, governments started the 
adoption of fiscal restrictions and rules started spreading around the world. 
Reforms of monetary policy frameworks characterized by establishment of independent and 
accountable central banks committed to policy rules were motivated in the contemporaneous 
theoretical work in favour of independent central banking and the welfare dominance of rules 
over discretion (Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Barro and Gordon, 1983). 
The positive results obtained with the new monetary policy framework, combined with 
countries’ growing excess debt accumulation led from 1990s onwards governments to adopt 
fiscal restrictions and rules as commitment devices devoted to improving fiscal discipline. 
Many years later, especially after the 2007–09 global financial crisis that weakened confidence 
in public debt sustainability, many governments established independent fiscal councils in order 
to strengthen the fiscal framework and boost the credibility of their commitment to meet their 
obligations. 
From the theoretical point of view, the management of fiscal policy both under commitment 
and discretion emerge in the model of Bianchi and Menegatti (2007), according to which 
commitment, in general, can either reduce or increase the government loss function: if the debt-
output ratio in the economy is small, then discretion is preferable, while, commitment is a better 
alternative for highly indebted economies. 
However, Badinger and Reuter (2015) point out how a discretionary fiscal policy can 
exacerbate the excess deficit and debt bias.   
The rest of the literature taken into consideration in chapter II deals with the “commitment 
versus discretion” debate in the government choice of the capital income tax and labour tax, 




always superior to the one under discretion. Hence commitment is said to be welfare-enhancing 
since private agents can allocate their wealth between investments and consumption in a better 
than under discretion. 
The empirical analysis in chapter III, performed using data inherent to 22 Euro Area countries 
for the period 2005-2018, suggests that fiscal rules and fiscal councils, interpreted as 
commitment devices, are associated with stronger fiscal performance as well as less biased and 
more accurate fiscal forecasts.  
The improvement in fiscal performance results from the first regression, in which general 
governments’ primary balance are regressed on some control variables and the two variables of 
interest: (i) the fiscal rule index, a variable representing the strength of countries fiscal rules 
and (ii) the dummy variable on the presence of a fiscal council in a specific country. 
The two coefficient of interest resulted positive and statistically significant, meaning that in 
general countries with stronger and the more stringent fiscal rules, and that in addition have a 
fiscal council in place, are characterized by higher general government primary balance. 
This result may suggest that countries that constrain their fiscal policy through the adoption of 
good commitment instruments are less prone to realize excess deficit and debt. 
For a country, having deficit and debt level on a sustainable paths can surely bring positive 
effects. It lowers macroeconomic uncertainty, that combined with better fiscal discipline allows 
a country to gain higher credibility at the international level, which may convert in a reduction 
of the cost of debt for example. In the world of private agents, instead, economic theory suggests 
that uncertainty has a detrimental effect on economic activity by giving agents the incentive to 
postpone investment, consumption and employment decisions until uncertainty is resolved. A 
lower macroeconomic uncertainty may increase social welfare by permitting agents to allocate 
their wealth between consumption and investment in a way that is welfare-improved with 
respect to the case of high uncertainty, where a larger part of the wealth is destined to 
precautionary savings. 
The second and third regression show that well-designed fiscal rules and councils are associated 
with less biased and more accurate forecasts (it is worth noting that for the accuracy of forecasts, 
the coefficient of the fiscal rules index is not significant). The ability to dispose of precise fiscal 
forecasts favours a more effective and conscious policy choice, which is again more likely to 
results in a lower deficit . Moreover, private agents’ expectations and behaviours are certainly 
influenced by forecasts, that -if more precise- permit them to have a more shaped idea of the 
near future. This, again, allows them to make better informed decisions as regards their level of 




With the Coronavirus pandemic and the related economic crisis, in the majority of countries 
fiscal rules have been suspended to allow governments to promptly intervene through welfare 
measures and mitigate the economic effect of the crisis. Their suspension has turned on critics 
with respect to their low adaptation to sudden economic shocks and made rise proposals for a 
revision of the fiscal framework. However, the effectiveness of fiscal rules and fiscal councils 
or, more in general, of a constrained fiscal policy, has to remain central in the debate, especially 
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